The Internet shutdown that began in Bangladesh on 18 July 2024 showed how services intended to work locally can also depend on infrastructure outside the country, according to a guest post published by APNIC. Its author argues that operators should identify and reduce those dependencies before another disruption occurs.
The shutdown was not caused by a cable failure. Internet Society Pulse reported that connectivity across the economy was almost entirely lost by the afternoon of 18 July and returned gradually after about five days. The Open Observatory of Network Interference said the full blackout lasted from 18 to 23 July, followed by blocks on social media and messaging apps from 24 to 31 July.
The economic impact was substantial, though estimates differ. The e-Commerce Association of Bangladesh estimated sector losses at around BDT 20 billion, while Internet Society’s NetLoss calculator put losses at more than USD 21 million in the first five days. The figures are estimates rather than audited totals.
At the INNOG 9 meeting, Sumon Ahmed Sabir of Fibre@Home discussed what happens when domestic networks continue operating but lose their links to the wider Internet. The examples in his presentation included overseas DNS resolvers, cloud-based application components, remote APIs, time synchronization and mobile payment platforms. Any of these dependencies can prevent a locally delivered service from working when international connectivity is unavailable.
The post recommends that operators map services relying on infrastructure outside the country, strengthen local DNS infrastructure, identify critical content that could be hosted locally, and test continuity plans against prolonged disruptions rather than only brief outages.
Bangladesh’s international connectivity relies on a relatively small number of submarine and terrestrial routes, including SEA-ME-WE 4, SEA-ME-WE 5 and connections through India. During maintenance work on SEA-ME-WE 5 in April 2026, users experienced slower connections and some interruptions while SEA-ME-WE 4 remained in service. Additional capacity, including the planned SEA-ME-WE 6, may improve resilience, but the post says operators still need to understand which local services depend on external infrastructure.
The same discussion also considered India, where Ashutosh Zutshi of NEC India highlighted the concentration of international connectivity at a limited number of landing locations, particularly Mumbai and Chennai. The post points to geographic and network diversity, as well as available capacity, as important aspects of resilience.
Sources: APNIC Blog.